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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230804T120000
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SUMMARY:Jesper Hoffmeyer Memorial Celebration Day
DESCRIPTION:In 2019\, shortly after the death of our dear friend and colleague\, Jesper Hoffmeyer\, a number of us began making plans for a Memorial Conference in his honour to take place the following spring at the University of Copenhagen. The arrival of the COVID pandemic in March of that year put an end to that plan\, as international travel was shut down for many countries until late last year. \nThis year\, to our great delight\, we members of the International Society for Biosemiotics Studies were granted permission to hold our 23rd Annual Gatherings in Biosemiotics in the exact same room where we held our very first Gatherings in 2001. \n“Biosemiotics has no beginning” Kalevi Kull reminds us often\, but like all organic processes\, one can trace major inflection points in its development\, with the publication of Jesper Hoffmeyer’s English language edition of Signs of Meaning in the Universe in 1996\, certainly qualifying as one of them\, and the first annual Gatherings in Biosemiotics\, organized by Jesper\, Kalevi and Claus Emmeche and held right here where we meet again this year\, qualifying as another one. \nIt is fitting\, then that we devote the last day of our conference to the man who\, through his writings\, allowed so many of us to find each other as intellectual kindred spirits\, and to build together this uniquely far-seeing community of scholars and friends. And yet\, as his colleagues once wrote of Jesper’s often ambivalent feelings towards academia: “Notwithstanding these activities\, a whole life devoted completely to teaching\, writing and scholarship would seem like a desert to him” (2002:43). \nAccordingly\, on the last day of our Gathering\, academic colleagues\, family\, and friends come together (both live and via video) to celebrate the life and legacy of Jesper Hoffmeyer\, not just as the renowned scholar and public intellectual that he was\, but also the many non-academic aspects of this remarkable man – as a friend\, family member\, schoolmate\, saxophonist\, newspaper columnist\, artistic inspiration\, jazz fan\, 1960s commune co-habitant\, and so much more. \nJesper touched the lives of many\, leaving behind a legacy that extends far beyond his pioneering research. On Friday\, August 4\, 2023\, we will gather to celebrate with beer and laughter this brilliant and convivial man. \n  \nReferences \nEmmeche\, C.\, K. Kull\, & Stjernfelt\, F. (2022). On biography. In C. Emmeche\, K. Kull & Stjernfelt\, F. (Eds.)\, Reading Hoffmeyer\, Rethinking Biology (pp. 35-44). Tartu: Tartu University Press. \nHoffmeyer\, J. (1996). Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington. Indiana University Press.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/jesper-hoffmeyer-memorial-tribute-day-details-to-come/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230804T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230804T003000
DTSTAMP:20230727T182401Z
CREATED:20230624T090501Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230727T182401Z
UID:1436-1691107200-1691109000@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Donald Favareau
DESCRIPTION:An Evening with Jesper Hoffmeyer\n  \nIn this half-hour video presentation\, Jesper Hoffmeyer recounts his early days as a “positivist” biochemist\, his involvement with the radical student movement in Denmark and Paris in 1968\, and how he came to help initiate the current project of biosemiotics – as well as how he sees the future development of the field. \nRecorded on August 17\, 2016\, this interview would turn out to be the last one he would ever give before the advent of the stroke that would from that time forward impair his speaking capabilities\, but not his endlessly active and creative mind. \nWe are delighted to be able to share excerpts from this fascinating two-hour interview at this commemorative Gatherings in his honour\, and to have Jesper with us once again share his warmth and wisdom in his own inimitable voice and fashion. The showing of the video will be followed by a short Q&A with the filmmaker\, and a panel discussion with some of Jesper’s colleagues from the early days of biosemiotics
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/favareau/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T170000
DTSTAMP:20230801T223444Z
CREATED:20230624T091129Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T223444Z
UID:1495-1691080200-1691082000@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Silver Rattasepp
DESCRIPTION:The Ontological Primacy of Umwelt\nIndividuation – the genesis of individual entities – is generally presumed to begin with the ontology of already constituted individuals. Thus claims Gilbert Simondon. Rather than describing the appearance of individual beings from something pre-individual\, the analysis of the appearance of concrete entities usually concerns itself with the appearance of composites\, in which ontological privilege is given to the already constituted individuals. Is this the case with Umwelt theory as well? A straightforward conception of umwelts would treat them as a composites of organism and environment\, and the emphasis is then on their mutual co-constitution through functional cycles. But does this not already assume the pre-constitution of both environments and organisms? If so\, another question could be asked: what is the origin and genesis of organisms and environments which are now\, as if after the fact\, to be indivisibly united once again by means of functional cycles? In an admittedly speculative vein\, and with the help of a certain resonance between the concepts of transaction\, individuation and schismogenesis\, the presentation attempts to propose that rather than organisms and environments\, it is the umwelt which is ontologically primary\, and that it is the internal division\, separation and individuation within umwelts which gives rise to the appearance of organisms together with their environments.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/rattasepp/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T163000
DTSTAMP:20230801T042051Z
CREATED:20230624T090854Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042051Z
UID:1473-1691078400-1691080200@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Brian Khumalo and Rick Stepp
DESCRIPTION:Refining how the term ‘Icon’ is conceived as a Step towards Nomothetic Descriptions of Behavioral-Ecological Events\nThe term icon is ubiquitous. For example\, in linguistics iconicity is conceived as the relationship between speech acts and meaning whereas in semiotics broadly\, iconicity is conceived as a grounded relationship between an icon and its referent. While these examples may be easier to reconcile than not\, fresh confusion has been introduced by Hoffman\, Manish\, and Chetan’s (2015) ‘Interface Theory of Perception’ (ITP) within perceptual science. The ITP also invokes icons as a foundational component. But are Hoffman and et al.’s ‘icons’ the same as semiotic ‘icons’? If not\, can these two definitions of ‘icon’ be reconciled? Taking their cue from von Uexküll\, the ITP posits that all biological organisms interact with the world via a species-specific user interface similar to a computer. The ITP builds on a theoretical assumption that perception did not evolve to represent reality as it is\, but rather to represent reality as it is useful to an organism thus maximizing fitness function. Consequently\, perceptual structures simplify reality to order and discriminate information and quell choice paralysis. Continuing with the computer analogy\, the ITP proposes that what organisms see as external objects are no different from computer icons. Icons in this way hide the complexity of a computer’s hardware and software and provide users units of interaction that are functional. Following Deely’s view that icons represent the first contact between sense perceptions and reality that generate initial qualitative experiences\, and Hoffmeyer’s description of iconic and indexical scaffolding\, we hope to show that the ITP icon and semiotic icon are one and the same. Providing some conceptual clarity for the term icon is important to minimize confusion amongst interested scholars. While potentially enriching\, a plurality of understanding can create challenges for interdisciplinary collaboration where the same analytical terms may be invoked with reference to a problem or event\, but understood differently by the parties involved. \n  \nReferences \nHoffmeyer\, J. (2015). Introduction: semiotic scaffolding. Biosemiotics\, 8(2)\, 153-158. \nHoffman\, D.D.\, Singh\, M. and Prakash\, C. (2015). The interface theory of perception. Psychonomic bulletin & review\, 22(6)\, pp.1480-1506. \nLockwood\, G. and Dingemanse\, M. (2015). Iconicity in the lab: A review of behavioral\, developmental\, and neuroimaging research into sound-symbolism. Frontiers in Psychology\, 6\, p.1246.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/khumalo-stepp/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T154500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T160000
DTSTAMP:20230801T042759Z
CREATED:20230624T091025Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042759Z
UID:1491-1691077500-1691078400@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Coffee break
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/coffee-break-8/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T151500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T154500
DTSTAMP:20230809T211832Z
CREATED:20230624T091008Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T211832Z
UID:1486-1691075700-1691077500@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Constantijn-Alexander Kusters
DESCRIPTION:Time and Emergence: Towards a narrative inspired understanding of temporal semiosis\n[Slides from the presentation] \nWhat is the nature of time? Since the Einstein-Bergson debate this question has often been divided into two camps. One camp approaching space-time in a point-like manner in terms of mathematics and/or physics\, and a second camp favouring an anthropocentric phenomenological approach which understands this experienced temporality as irreducible to the ontological universality of Einstein’s space-time. In contrast\, this paper brings these two camps closer together by showing how temporality should be understood as an emergent phenomenon in the context of teleodynamic organization. This third approach leaves open a variety of roles time can play in different forms of dynamic organisation\, providing a more comprehensive understanding of its role in semiotic dynamics. Biosemiotically\, this also accounts for and affords time’s experience according to diverse Umwelten. \nTerrence Deacon’s model of autogenesis is shown to follow the same minimal logic of narrative exemplified by Claude Bremond’s structuralist writings on minimal narrative logic (Bremond 1980). By subsequently comparing Paul Ricœur’s narrative extension of hermeneutic temporality (Ricœur 2008) with how “inside and outside” are divided through individuating processes found in Deacon’s simplest model of teleodynamics\, the autogen model (Deacon 2013)\, is set out to understand temporality in this minimal form. Specifically\, Ricœur’s embracing of what he calls the aporetic nature of time is taken up\, which in part can be understood as the incommensurability of cosmic time (“universal” time i.e.\, the regular movement of celestial bodies) and phenomenological time (lived experience of time). By subsequently unstably “resolving” these two times in a continuous mimetic narrativization\, Ricœur’s narrative temporality reveals itself in congruence with the emergence of teleodynamics. We find similarly in teleodynamics that the difference between “inside and outside\,” while never “resolved\,” is mimetically mediated in (not) realizing the purpose expressed in the direction of teleodynamic organization. \nIt is then necessary to consider the threefold aspects of time in this context; (1) time “inside” which deals with change in terms of internal autocatalytic reactions necessary for autogenesis\, (2) time “outside” which is the change in context of the autogen’s environment\, and (3) in the process where “inside” and “outside” come together as mediated through attaining the purpose of its own self-replication. Neither (1)\, (2)\, or (3)\, can therefore be taken by themselves\, nor can they be reduced to a mere point in time as they all have a duration which influences the eventual success (or failure) of the self-replication. Insofar that more or less time is spent in relation to each could influences the outcome of self-replication\, a shift to a kind of temporal “thickness” is required capable of dealing with time in terms of meaning-making. This is “thickness” to the extent that it is the duration of time spent autocatalyzing (1)\, the duration of being in a contextually changing environment (2)\, and the duration of the process of self-replication (3) which influence the successfulness of attaining the continuation of this proto-evolutionary line. This extends work in biohermeneutics which till now had limited exposure to narrative temporality\, some exceptions being the work of Arran Gare and Anton Markoš. Introducing a narrative model of time to the emergence of semiotic dynamism capable of supporting meaningful time differentiation. \nReferences \nBremond\, C. (1980). The Logic of Narrative Possibilities. New Literary History\, 11(3)\, 387. \nDeacon\, T. W. (2013). Incomplete nature: how mind emerged from matter (1. paperback ed.). New York London: W.W. Norton. \nRicœur\, P. (2008). Time and narrative. Vol. 3. (K. McLaughlin\, Trans.) (Repr.\, Vol. 3). Chicago\, III.: Univ. of Chicago Press.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/klusters/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T144500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T151500
DTSTAMP:20230809T212159Z
CREATED:20230624T091128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212159Z
UID:1494-1691073900-1691075700@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Pauline Delahaye
DESCRIPTION:Diagnosing\, Modelling and Solving Interspecies Cohabitation Issues: Anatomy of the Shared Semiosphere\n[Slides from the presentation] \nIn this communication\, I will present different steps of diagnosing and modelling a shared urban semiosphere in order to solve interspecies cohabitation issues. Mainly\, this presentation will introduce key concepts needed for this work and methods used – what elements should be included in a basic corpus? In a more detailed one? What methodology should be preferred depending on the context and circumstances and what are its potential flaws? How to encourage a good and relevant interdisciplinary dialogue? All these questions will be addressed by presenting and comparing two projects in Paris (Delahaye\, 2021) and Tartu\, the last one being used as a case study. \nIn this presentation\, we will use the concept of semiosphere as defined by Hoffmeyer (1997) as “a sphere just like the atmosphere\, the hydrosphere and the biosphere”\, incorporating all kinds of “signs of life”. In this sense it could also be called in different ways like “semiotic ecosystem” or “ecosemiosphere” (Maran\, 2021)\, to use a specific term with a separate meaning. This question of terminology\, as well as others that could lead to confusion\, will be briefly discussed. \nAll the results and methodologies introduced in this communication are from a just-completed project in Tartu\, aiming to study relationships and interactions between humans and liminal species\, using the urban corvids as a case study – Corvus cornix\, Corvus frugilegus\, Coloeus monedula and\, to a lesser extent\, Corvus corone as comparative observations with the city of Paris. \nResults obtained will include elements of ethology or biology\, elements of anthropology and literary elements\, in order to present an exhaustive overview of this fundamentally interdisciplinary methodology. Methodological tools will be given in order to make these different and various components interact in an efficient way and to allow a potential investigator to interpret them in a relevant manner\, no matter their academic speciality or background. \n  \nReferences \nDelahaye\, P. (2021). Rats\, Mice and Humans. Linguistic Frontiers\, 4(1)\, 44‑52. https://doi.org/10.2478/lf-2021-0004 \nHoffmeyer\, J. (1997). Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Indiana University Press. \nMaran\, T. (2021). The Ecosemiosphere is a Grounded Semiosphere. A Lotmanian Conceptualization of Cultural-Ecological Systems. Biosemiotics\, 14(2)\, 519‑530. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-021-09428-w
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/delahaye/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T141500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T144500
DTSTAMP:20230809T212311Z
CREATED:20230624T091026Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212311Z
UID:1493-1691072100-1691073900@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Tim Ireland
DESCRIPTION:The Cognitive Spiral: Semiotic Freedom & Space\n[Slides from the presentation] \nSpace has history and has taken different forms in different societies and at different times depending on the experiences accounted for and the available means to externalise and represent these (Jammer 2013). The representation is conditional on the technique used\, delineating a cognitive loop between representation and comprehension that narrows the conception of space to a direct reference to that which is perceived. In other words\, the method of representation determines the perception of that represented\, and vice versa. A self-reinforcing cycle between inner “mental” space and outer world\, whereby cognition is a form of niche by which we adapt to and mould the world according to our purposes and desires. \nGeometry is one way experience is replicated and through which problems are solved. ”[A] certain schematization of experience\, which we may call space […] in the sense that it is formed from experience by the application of some principle (Wiener and Masani 1976:99). Peirce does not say much about space but what he does say correlates with Uexküll presentation of space because their thinking is based in sign-action. In The Order of Nature Peirce emphasises there are “general truths” that are so extraordinary that “even if we are to suppose that they are not strictly universal truths\, we cannot possibly think that they have been reached by pure accident.” And that the “most remarkable laws of this kind are those of time and space” (EP1:180). He implies space is not just an idea\, but a fundamental feature of life\, tied to causal relations between things and their effect in the process of perception-action. Peirce presents\, albeit in nascent form\, space to be a product of excitation produced through sign-relations\, which correlates with Uexküll’s definition. For\, like the idea of ‘force’\, “in its rudiments\, is another conception so early arrived at\, and found in animals so low in the scale of intelligence\, that it must be supposed innate” (EP1:180-181). A scaffold\, or natural law which is an essential component of living things. From the simplest to the most intricate. “The great utility and indispensableness of the conceptions of time\, space\, and force\, even to the lowest intelligence\, are such to suggest that they are the results of natural selection. Without something like geometrical\, kinetical and mechanical conceptions\, no animal could seize his food or do anything which might be necessary” (EP1:181). We might infer from this (on the premise that an organism’s world is constituted of a plethora of signs available to it) the first principle of Umwelt theory; that the synthesis between an organism’s and its environment expands relative to the complexity of the organism. Hence space is defined by an organism’s semiotic freedom. In Uexküll we find the biological roots of space\, and in Peirce we find the semiotic supposition for the forming of space (understood to be a network of relations)\, to be a process of sign-action. \nI aim to illustrate how the above Peircean-Uexkullian notion of space infers a cognitive spiral whereby space (or a cell-centric model of) extends from a fundamental model (i.e.\, that of a cell) to more developed\, nuanced and complex forms of space (such as our own); and that this corresponds to the idea of a developmental process\, or stages\, of spatial intelligence\, which transfers through human cultural representation and the built environment. \n  \nReferences \nHouser\, N.\, & Kloesel\, C. J. (1992). The Essential Peirce\, Volume 1: Selected Philosophical Writings (1867–1893). Indiana University Press. \nJammer\, Max (2013). Concepts of space: the history of theories of space in physics: third. Courier Corporation. \nWiener\, Norbert and Pesi Rustom Masani (1976). Norbert Wiener Collected Works with Commentaries. MIT Press.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/ireland/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T131500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T141500
DTSTAMP:20230801T042640Z
CREATED:20230624T091008Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042640Z
UID:1487-1691068500-1691072100@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Lunch
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/lunch-4/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T131500
DTSTAMP:20230809T212420Z
CREATED:20230624T091025Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212420Z
UID:1492-1691066700-1691068500@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Alin Olteanu
DESCRIPTION:A Biosemiotic Approach to Gender: Avoiding Morphological Freedom\n[Slides from the lecture] \nThis paper proposes a biosemiotic approach to gender. I argue that\, in order for biosemiotic theory to be properly relevant for the humanities and social sciences in general\, a biosemiotic discourse on gender and sexuality is needed. Also\, I explain that a biosemiotic approach to gender is particularly insightful for current debates in cultural studies. \nWhile biosemiotics studies meaning as embodied and environmental and has been recently employed in cultural criticism (Cobley 2016)\, it did not address gender\, so far. Both gender studies and feminism have been founded and dominated by a (post)structuralist array of semiotic theories\, which tend to compete with theories that take Peirce’s pragmatism as foundational\, such as\, par excellence\, biosemiotics. Also\, the popular construal of gender as performed culturally and through behavior (Butler 1993) rests on analytical philosophy of language\, which is at odds with the biosemiotic perspective (Cobley 2016). \nWithout overlooking the merits of established approaches in gender studies\, I unfurl what a biosemiotic view entails for gender and explain the main differences between these two perspectives. To begin with\, a biosemiotic approach construes gender according to how gender is involved in the construction of environments (Umwelten)\, understood as the subjective phenomenal worlds of organisms. As such\, gender appears as a continuously evolving dimension of a semiotic agent. More than fluid\, gender is never fixed. As from a Peircean perspective knowing subjects are never ‘complete’ selves\, neither do they ever arrive at ‘complete’ versions of our gender and sexuality. Further\, gender is understood to both depend on and reconfigure the affordances and semiotic competences that an organism has as its disposal in an environment. Hence\, gender is conceived not only as limited by the past (natural evolution\, cultural constraints) and performed in the present but also in a future-oriented interrogation of what the self may become. \nI argue that a biosemiotics interrogation of gender can tackle the currently salient\, difficult and controversial notion of morphological freedom\, particularly characteristic for transhumanism (Sandberg 2013). This notion holds that\, by expanding the mind through science and technology\, the morphology of bodies can be rendered obsolete in regard to consciousness and the constitution of agency. While it contradicts decades of philosophy of embodiment\, the notion is very difficult to attack without making controversial implications. I explain that a biosemiotic view posits that (material) forms of bodies and in environments (landscapes) play a role in the construction of gender but while still allowing for a transhuman construal of selves as becoming. From this perspective\, gender is a present and open becoming towards a variety of possible futures. As such\, biosemiotics can make an important step in the direction of Butler’s (1993) proposal to dissolve the dichotomy of culture and materiality through the notion of queerness. \n  \nReferences \nButler\, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of “sex”. Routledge. \nCobley\, P. (2016). Cultural implications of biosemiotics. Springer. \nSandberg\, A. (2013). Morphological freedom – why we not just want it\, but need it. In: Max More\, Natasha Vita-More. Eds. The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science\, Technology\, and Philosophy of the Human Future\, 56-64. John Wiley & Sons.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/olteanu/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T124500
DTSTAMP:20230809T212512Z
CREATED:20230624T091025Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212512Z
UID:1490-1691064900-1691066700@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Mario Giampetro
DESCRIPTION:The biosemiotic process: How to reproduce and adapt the identity of social systems by combining emotions and language\n[Slides from the presentation] \n  \nBiosemiotics concerns the process of learning of complex adaptive systems that operate across multiple scales and levels of organization. This comprises the formation of informed autocatalytic processes (functional cycles) that can express an adaptable identity by establishing an impredicative entailment between the (tangible) biophysical expression of a complex metabolic pattern and a (notional) “expected state”. Reproducing and adapting this identity requires effective communication within semiotic controls. By iterating the making of models of themselves (on the notional side) and the instantiation of these models (on the tangible side) these systems manage to preserve the meaning of tangible information carriers used in this communication. In this way\, the identity of the biosemiotic process remains the same (at the level of the whole) even when the various elements – the types in the models (on the notional side) and the instances in the metabolic networks (on the tangible side) – change in time. Thus\, the biosemiotic process makes copies of itself through time\, but these copies neither refer to specific instances of structural elements nor to the representations of the types recorded on the notional side; they refer to holons instead. \nI postulate that the differences between the semiotic processes in ecological and human systems are related to the use of a language in the human system that permits a reflexive definition of identity. Humans must define their own group identity (to be preserved) using themselves as an external referent. To do so\, they create an exosomatic mind—i.e.\, a collective UMWELT and awareness tailored to the chosen group identity—that is described and operationalized by using a language. This represents a major complication in their biosemiotic process (i.e.\, the mind versus body bifurcation). Luhmann suggests that the formation and evolution of human society is determined by an iteration between: (i) communications (in the notional part—REPRESENTATION) carried out by the collective MIND that stores\, reproduces and updates the existing knowledge claims\, anticipatory models\, institutional organization\, rules and norms; and (ii) interactions (in the tangible part—ACTION)\, needed to check the viability of the metabolic pattern associated with the reproduction and operation of its structural and functional components (humans and technological devices). The resonance between communication and interaction relies on the same strategy as adopted by ecological systems (the adaptive cycle): human societies send messages to themselves across hierarchical levels to achieve TRANSDUCTION. In ecological systems transduction is carried out by biophysical processes regulated by codes – using either types to make instances (downward causation) or instances to define types (upward causation). In human society\, on the other hand\, this commuting across the epistemic cut (notional/tangible) takes place across two external contexts: (i) the psychic structure—”the body” of the society (the endosomatic experience of feelings of individuals). Here emotions\, fears\, aspirations\, and dreams affect the definition of the group identity (final causes) and therefore ultimately affect the “rational decisions” of the mind; and (ii) the biophysical context of the metabolic network that determines the feasibility and viability of interactions. The communications that a society transmits to itself are sent and received by many different purpose-driven agents operating within different UMWELTs. The meaning of this heterogeneous flow of communications (based on non-equivalent external referents and non-reducible types of awareness) cannot be preserved by using a formal language\, but only by shared feelings associated with affective interactions in the psychic structure.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/giampetro/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T114500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T121500
DTSTAMP:20230801T042709Z
CREATED:20230624T091009Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042709Z
UID:1488-1691063100-1691064900@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:John Schumann
DESCRIPTION:Symbolic Concepts and Physicality\n  \nIn this paper\, I will address four aspects of physicality as they relate to symbolic concepts: science and symbolic concepts\, entropy\, self-organization\, and biological energy. \nI have suggested that certain concepts do not have exclusively physical referents. They refer to concepts that lack mass\, energy\, and observability\, but nevertheless\, they maintain one characteristic of physicality (ie\, causal effects). Such symbolic concepts include democracy\, agency\, law\, defense\, absurdity\, consciousness\, happiness\, rigidity\, truth\, grounding\, reference\, science\, meaning\, hate\, physicality\, mental concepts\, mind\, information. \nSCIENCE AND SYMBOLIC CONCEPTS. It is interesting to note that in much of scientific discourse\, the concept “abstract” is entirely acceptable\, but the concept “nonphysical” is taboo. But often the very definitions of “abstract” indicate that such concepts lack physicality (eg\, “Abstract thinking is the ability to understand concepts that are real\, such as freedom or vulnerability\, but are not directly tied to concrete physical objects and experiences” (Joy\, R.\, 2019). Could it be the case that\, within the context of a scientific endeavor\, there is a tendency to assume that the concepts reference physical entities? In other words\, do we assume that if we are doing science\, we are examining the physical world? Have we implicitly modeled the world such that we expect all concepts to refer to material entities? \nENTROPY. Entropy is generally seen as a tendency for dissipation\, decrease/loss of energy through work. Symbolic concepts might be seen as entropic phenomena (lexical/conceptual entropy) from several perspectives. Symbolic concepts get their meaning from other words with related meanings and are therefore difficult to define. They have multiple meanings and therefore their referents can be difficult to predict and thus interpret. As a result\, they produce uncertainty. Their meanings can change over time\, and they may be difficult if not impossible to translate into another language. Average entropy measures average information\, and thus it is a measurement of uncertainty (Solms\, 2021\, p.157). As applied to the physicality issue addressed here\, we might argue that the more definitions and synonyms that a particular concept carries\, the greater the entropy\, the uncertainty\, and the predictability of the meaning of a concept in a particular context. \nSELF ORGANIZATION. Could symbolic concepts be\, in some way\, self-organizing phenomena? Could the fact that they lack mass\, energy\, observability make them essentially open to several meanings by having iconic features that allow them to be considered similar or identical to other concepts. Their quasi-physicality makes them abstract and therefore\, to a significant extent\, liberates them from the strictly physical world. \nBIOLOGICAL ENERGY. In a discussion of the biological phenomenon of arousal\, Pfaff (2005) says “satisfying the need for an ‘energy source’ for behavior\, arousal explains the initiation and persistence of motivated behavior in a wide variety of species… a concept like arousal is necessary to explain the initiation\, strength\, and persistence of behavioral responses.” \n  \nReferences \nJoy\, R. (2019) Abstract thinking. (p.1-2)\, HealthLine. \nPfaff\, D. (2005)\, Brain Arousal and Information Theory. Cambridge\, MA\, Harvard University Press\, cited in Solms\, M. (2021)\, The Hidden Spring: A Journey to the Source of Consciousness (p. 306).)
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/schumann/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T113000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T114500
DTSTAMP:20230801T042452Z
CREATED:20230624T091008Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042452Z
UID:1484-1691062200-1691063100@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Coffee break
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/coffee-break-7/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T113000
DTSTAMP:20230809T212628Z
CREATED:20230624T091008Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212628Z
UID:1485-1691060400-1691062200@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Liqian Zhou & Qiufen Sun
DESCRIPTION:More constraints\, more freedom: Revisiting semiotic scaffolding\, semiotic freedom\, and semiotic emergence\n[Slides from the presentation] \nTechnically\, constraint is defined as the reduction of degree of freedom. However\, novelties emerge in dynamic systems with constraints. Constraints make once almost impossible states become possible. That is\, constraint may raise the probability of the actual realization of possible states once being only possible but having rare chance to actually realize. When a dynamic system stabilizes to a state with certain constraints\, it provides a scaffolding for new possibilities at higher level. Therefore\, Emergence of novelties at a higher level is possible. We may say\, more constraints create more freedom. \nThis way of understanding dynamic emergence may also help us further understand Jesper Hoffmeyer’s seminal works on semiotic scaffolding\, semiotic freedom\, and semiotic emergence. Semiotic scaffolding makes semiotic freedom of living systems possible. As Hoffmeyer (2015) argues\, \n  \n“Yet\, this particular strategy potentially ignites a self-perpetuating evolutionary dynamics\, since each step taken by a species along this route potentially opens new agendas for further change: the more capable some species are of anticipating and interpreting complex and fast changing situations or events\, the more will evolution favor the development in other species of a well-adjusted set of semiotic tools.” \n  \nIn the presentation\, I will take Terrence Deacon‘s work on the origin of life and therefore of semiosis as an example to show how semiotic scaffolding and semiotic emergence can be understood in terms of the dialectics of constraint and freedom. This understanding indicates that semiotics emergence is a dynamic emergence which is a kind of weak emergence rather than strong ones. It also brings new insight to reconsider the epistemic cut. \n  \nReferences  \nBruni\, L. E. (2008). Semiotic freedom: Emergence and teleology in biological and cognitive Interfaces. The American Journal of Semiotics\, 24(1/3)\, 57-73. \nDeacon\, T. (2021). How molecules become signs. Biosemiotics\, 14\, 537-559. \nHoffmeyer\, J. (2007). Semiotic scaffolding of living systems. In Babieri\, M. (ed). Introduction to Biosemiotics: The New Biological Synthesis. Dordrecht: Springer\, 149-166. \n  \n 
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/zhou-sun/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T103000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T110000
DTSTAMP:20230809T212739Z
CREATED:20230624T090954Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212739Z
UID:1483-1691058600-1691060400@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Hongbing Yu
DESCRIPTION:Danger Modeling: Meaning-generation in Three Dimensions\n[Slides from the presentation] \nIn the struggle for existence\, any known species of organisms must avert danger to ensure survival. To do that\, they need to identify—or model—it in ways that are specific to their species and actualized in concrete situations. This is an act of generating meaning that falls perfectly within the purview of biosemiotics. The present chapter uses human danger modeling as a case in point to discuss meaning-generation in the biosemiotic context. The rationale is a three-fold one. Firstly\, the study of danger\, understood in the aspect of meaning-generation\, makes an example of semiotic analysis\, because warning signs are among the most primordial and relevant vehicles for meaning. Secondly\, the Sebeokian concept of modeling serves as a useful tool to tackle this problem. The reason is that the concept underscores semiotic agency and promises to be a highly integrative framework for studying meaning-generation. Thirdly\, humans have evolved into such complex superorganisms that we not only live by existential modeling and semiotic modeling at same time but also deeply entangled in our own semiotic webs while probing into and creating possibilities of new meanings. This threefold rationale underlines the need for a comprehensive approach that considers meaning-generation as actualized in different dimensions. This chapter identifies three such dimensions\, namely\, the representational\, interpretational\, and existential dimension. These three dimensions form a system that corresponds roughly to the Peircean triad of semiosis.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/yu/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T103000
DTSTAMP:20230809T212835Z
CREATED:20230624T090954Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212835Z
UID:1482-1691056800-1691058600@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Michael Yudanin
DESCRIPTION:Discursivity and semiotic complexity as driving the shape of animal choice and human freedom\n[Slides from the presentation] \nBiosemiotics\, it seems\, holds the key not only to understanding life but also to one of the more intractable issues that has been bewildering philosophy for a long while – the question of freedom. If we are to try and reconcile the possibility of free choice with biological facts\, we ought to explain how biochemically constructed beings\, subject to biological and thus ultimately physical causality\, can be capable of choosing between alternatives\, not randomly but deliberately\, as random choice can hardly qualify as meaningful control of an organism over itself. Moreover\, we will have to explain it while taking into consideration both the diversity of life on Earth and its evolutionary development. I will argue that Hoffmeyer\, when he attached the name of semiotic freedom to the semiotic complexity that reflects “the depth of meaning communicated or interpreted by living systems\,” is hinting at an important dependency: the degree of freedom is determined by the organism’s capacity to communicate and interpret more complex indicators (Hoffmeyer\, 2010). In the conception of freedom I will be advocating\, the capacity for choice is potentially present in all life and is realized when an organism becomes capable of both acting in the world and representing alternatives to its own consciousness\, or achieving a certain level of Hoffmeyer’s semiotic complexity. The scope of freedom here is determined by the organism’s Umwelt. Yet\, when discursive meta-cognition appears\, the Umwelt becomes vastly more dynamic\, subject more to the limits imposed by the human organism’s own intent rather than merely to the boundaries defined by physiology. This is no simple supervenience: the choices we make consciously alter the boundaries of our semiosphere\, as do the choices others make. This changes the semiotic dynamics of freedom and makes it a very interesting research subject with implications that go beyond individual and all the way to educational and other policies\, as I will try to suggest. \n  \nReferences \nHoffmeyer\, J. (2010). God and the World of Signs: Semiotics and the Emergence of Life. Zygon\, 45(2)\, 367-390.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/yunadin/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T100000
DTSTAMP:20230809T212931Z
CREATED:20230624T090954Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212931Z
UID:1481-1691055000-1691056800@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Alexei Sharov
DESCRIPTION:Semiotics of potential meanings\n[Slides from the presentation] \nBecause semiosis is coextensive with living and life-dependent semiotic agents\, meanings (relations of entities to something else that is significant for agents) exist only on condition that semiotic agency exists capable of using/interpreting them. However\, meanings can be actual or potential\, depending on whether they are interpreted by semiotic agents at the given time\, or not interpreted\, respectively. An example of potential meaning is a natural resource (or its feature) that initially has not been utilized by organisms because of the lack of either sense organs or ‘knowledge’ of how to do it. Later\, when agents gained access to this resource by adaptive evolution and/or by learning\, potential meaning turns into actual meaning. \nBecause intrinsic properties of resources remain the same before and after actualization\, it makes sense to consider such potential meanings existing even before they become actual\, but retrospectively. Physics describes potentiality as a field that can be measured at any point in space by an appropriate device. Thus\, I suggest treating potential meaning as a semiotic field that can be measured by some competent semiotic agent if it is placed near the meaning carrier (which is a potential sign). By observing the activity of the agent (e.g.\, living cell) we can simultaneously detect the existence of meaning that was in a potential state before the experiment\, and the capacity of the agent to respond. Thus\, the ontology of meanings is agency-dependent and knowledge-dependent. Meaning is subjective when initially discovered\, but it can spread via communication and become objective within the community of agents. The collective knowledge is updated with the emergence of each new kind of agency: first\, actual meanings are updated in space-and-time proximity of these new agents\, and second\, potential meanings are updated in the whole universe\, as well as in the reconstructed past\, and in the projected future. \nRetrospectively\, the origin of life can be explained as a transition of some pre-existing potential meanings (e.g.\, resources and catalysts) into actual meanings that acquire goal-directedness via collective mutual support and propagation. Thus\, life most likely emerged in complex micro-environments enriched in non-redundant potential meanings. Following Deely\, I assume that such complex environments can ignite the origin of life or provide resources for already existing life. Evolution of living organisms continued actualization of some already existing potential meanings\, and these actualized natural meanings together with new artificial meanings became encoded in hereditary signs and memory for the purpose of reusing them when necessary within the lifespan and beyond (in the progeny). Memory in organisms is a repository of potential meanings (i.e.\, passive memory units that can be activated to communicate their meaning) that enables organisms to adapt on demand by activating interpretation of these potential meanings.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/sharov/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T170000
DTSTAMP:20230809T213244Z
CREATED:20230624T090826Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T213244Z
UID:1465-1690993800-1690995600@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Mikhail Ilyin & Nikolai Skipin
DESCRIPTION:The thresholds for extending the evolutionary synthesis: How far can we go?\n[Slides from the presentation] \nThe research project “Methodological design of extended evolutionary synthesis: interdisciplinary framework for social and life sciences” (Russian Science Foundation\, № 22-18-00383) faces the challenges of crossing interfaces between traditional scientific disciplines\, paradigms (in Kuhn’s sense)\, research programmes (in Lakatos’ sense) and even subtler exploratory projects. Our point of departure is the need to fully utilize the potential of interpretation and thus of semiotics with its interpretant as the utmost noumenal instance of cognition. It seems promising to move top-down through the layers of scientific knowledge from the humanities and social sciences towards the life sciences and further to chemistry and physics as well as to quantum mechanics and cosmology with its string theories\, etc. However adventurous this idea may seem\, the Anthropic Principle in any of its versions implies that interpretation along with observation\, calculus and patterning is universal and applicable to any state of the Observed (measured\, shaped and interpreted) Universe or its constituents. But it is even more evident that interpretation as we use it in our everyday lives – moreover in social and human research – cannot be bluntly applied to study of life forms or molecules or galaxies. We all know about fallacies of anthropomorphism and other obvious cognitive restrictions and methodological censures. \nWe also know that although Kantian antinomies cannot be resolved once and for good\, our human cognitive capacities to conclude (Urteilskäfte) allow us to find here and now pragmatic and palliative solutions. Such solutions inherently are specific and not universal. But consistent exploring of their systematic series and sequences may allow us to disclose transitory forms as well as their pragmatic and palliative mutual interaction. Typically cases and instances reveal themselves on the interfaces or thresholds between domains of our Observable Universe or thresholds of human cognition and scientific investigation. \nThe much-discussed biosemiotic threshold is a typical case of this. Different authors and schools of thought debate if interpreting and coding stay on different sides of the divide or on the opposing banks of Rubicon\, or mingle on the threshold created by the overlapping of distinctly different domains dominated either by coding alone or coding with interpreting. The paper suggests we should go further and explore a series of far-fetching reductions of interpreting and coding. This series may include copying (making an alternative sample of the original)\, reproducing (making another instance of something which is separate and selfsame)\, and finally pulsating (reappearing again and again). All those distinctly different forms can be related to each other by the usage of a common operational scheme: recursion with inversion or rather recursion with an inverse switch.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/skipin-ilyin/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T163000
DTSTAMP:20230809T213702Z
CREATED:20230624T090910Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T213702Z
UID:1477-1690992000-1690993800@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Morten Tønnessen
DESCRIPTION:A biosemiotic perspective on the human condition and the environmental crisis\n[Slides from the presentation] \nIn this presentation I will present the book chapter “A biosemiotic perspective on the human condition and the environmental crisis” (Tønnessen\, forthcoming). The chapter presents a biosemiotic perspective on the basic situation for human beings and that of other organisms\, with an emphasis on the subjective experience of sentient animals\, and the sign use of all lifeforms. The human condition is portrayed as traditionally conceived\, and then revisited in the new context of the current environmental crisis. In recent decades\, the expression ‘The Human Condition’ has been strongly associated with the political philosopher Hannah Arendt (1906–1975). In her book with the same name (Arendt 1958)\, she stresses that “[t]he earth is the very quintessence of the human condition”\, and yet argues that “the “human artifice of the world separates human existence from all mere animal environment”.  \nIn this sense\, in her view\, human reality is distinguished from the reality of any other living being on Earth\, despite our shared ecological circumstances. A cornerstone of the chapter is an analysis of the materiality of the environmental crisis\, and how the massive changes humans have caused in the physical environment can be understood in light of the semiotic agency of humans and other living beings. Experiential aspects of the environmental crisis are highlighted. The aim of the chapter is to improve our understanding of our species´ place in the natural world\, our historical role in causing a global crisis for life\, and how we can move forward towards a more sustainable future.  \nAs Masatake Shinohara (2020) has proposed\, “what conditions human beings in the most fundamental sense includes not only the world of the human artifact but also the world of earthly things”\, and in light of this\, “the consideration of the human condition should be fundamentally reformulated” by making the human world “open to the earthly things that vastly expand outside of the human artifice”. \n  \nReferences \nArendt\, Hannah (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. \nShinohara\, Masatake (2020). “Rethinking the Human Condition in the Ecological Collapse”. The New Centennial Review 20(2): 177–203. \nTønnessen\, Morten\, forthcoming. A biosemiotic perspective on the human condition and the environmental crisis. In Lenart Škof\, Sashinungla\, Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir (eds.)\, Elemental- Embodied Thinking for a New Era (Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures). Springer.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/tonnessen/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T163000
DTSTAMP:20230727T182907Z
CREATED:20230624T090910Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230727T182907Z
UID:1476-1690992000-1690993800@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Coffee break
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/coffee-break-6/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T151500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T154500
DTSTAMP:20230801T042329Z
CREATED:20230624T090953Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042329Z
UID:1480-1690989300-1690991100@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Aleksei Turovski
DESCRIPTION:An attempt at a semiotic approach to animal play and joking\nPlay in the animal kingdom is an extremely widespread phenomenon\, most studied in higher vertebrates (birds and mammals)\, but clearly existing in the behavior of reptiles and fish\, possibly even arachnids and insects. Definitely in cephalopods\, chiefly octopuses. \nThe phenomenon of animal play is extremely multifarious and multilayer\, so its definition is subject to many difficulties. In this paper\, I attempt to use the definition proposed by Bekoff and Byers: “Play is all motor activity performed postnatally that appears to be purposeless\, in which motor patterns from other contexts may often be used in modified forms and altered temporal sequences. If the activity is directed toward another living being\, it is called social play.” (Animal Play: Evolutionary\, Comparative\, and Ecological Perspectives\, Bekoff M\, Byers J\, Ed. p. 99) \nStuart Brown\, in stating that animals have an intrinsic urge to play\, declares that play forms one of the basic ways for animals to gain knowledge of themselves and their environment through adaptive\, flexible and pleasure-laden action. (Ibid\, p. 254) \nI must confess that I’m not very happy with the use of the term “purposeless” for I am convinced that animals (vertebrates at least) have an intrinsic need to have fun or\, dare I say\, the need to leave and get impressions\, in accordance with which I propose a definition of the signs of involvement as perceptible traits of animal activity indicating that the animal’s attention is purposefully engaged and targeted in a certain behavioral context. \nThis approach opens up a field of study of swift and extremely targeted signs in animal play. We know very well that young animals play with all manner of objects in all manner of circumstances in display of practically all major forms of behavior\, such as sexual\, social\, defensive\, parental\, comfort etc. Whereas playing with living creatures\, in terms of both intra- and interspecies contacts\, animals use very specific signs designating the situation strictly as play. Most-studied examples include the canine “bow” as an invitation to play\, ravens’ khrr-klack sound as an invitation for a play flight etc. \nIn my experience\, different species of animals\, especially in post-childhood and adult life\, develop a special kind of play\, which seems to me as playing with situations of play. An animal engaged in such activity holds back the specific “play” sign\, starting a detailed imitation of a sexual advance or attack\, dominance etc. but immediately displaying the previously omitted “play” sign at the first hint of the adversary exhibiting the proper reaction to the non-play activity. \nThis I would describe as “joking” between animals. Joking of this kind is easily observable in the behavior of apes\, monkeys but also bears\, canids\, felines\, Corvidae and parrots. It seems to me that in animal play\, and especially in jocular play\, enhanced possibilities of mutagenesis in memes takes place. Therefore\, it could be very interesting in the study of the evolution of signs.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/turovski/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T144500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T151500
DTSTAMP:20230809T214058Z
CREATED:20230624T090910Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T214058Z
UID:1478-1690987500-1690989300@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Nicola Zengiaro
DESCRIPTION:Ecosemiotics between matter and life: starting from John Deely’s interpretation of semiotic scaffolding\n[Slides from the presentation] \nThe presentation is an extension of the arguments proposed by John Deely in his article “Building a Scaffold: Semiosis in Nature and Culture”\, published in 2015 in the journal Biosemiotics. In particular\, the idea that physical scaffolding prepares the plans for the advent of organic life will be extended. In this sense\, Deely suggests that there is a semio-material support that serves as a condition and direction for the «erection of a scaffolding moving the lifeless universe in the direction of being able to support life» (349). His theoretical hypothesis seeks to show how semiosis could extend beyond life\, onto a physical universe that determines the conditions of possibility for the emergence of organisms. Thus\, semiogenesis\, if it is possible to speak of genesis\, could be sought in its material dimensions. This somehow seems to propose a counter-proposal regarding the premises of biosemiotics\, that life and semiosis are co-extensive. \nThe argumentation will consist of three parts: firstly\, Deely’s arguments proposed in the article will be briefly summarised\, emphasizing the thesis that semiosis extends beyond life; secondly\, a dialogue between biosemiotics and physiosemiotics will be proposed through an ecosemiotic reinterpretation that integrates the material plane into the semiosis of nature; finally\, thanks to the notion of semiotic scaffolding\, a resemantization of physiosemiotics will be presented\, embedding it in the study of ecosystemic semiotics. \nThe aim of the talk is to link Deely’s argument\, which is posited from a physiosemiotic point of view\, with contemporary advances in biosemiotics. From this perspective\, we can read Deely’s proposal in syntony with biosemiotics\, using ecosemiotics as a tool to harmoniously integrate the two discourses. In fact\, if we think of ecosemiotics through a holistic perspective\, we can combine the biotic and the abiotic\, the organic and the inorganic\, nature and culture\, life and non-life through a continuity that stands on the semiotic scaffolding. Taking Deely’s proposal about the materiality of the scaffolding preparing life seriously\, it could be understood as the material structure that brings forth the process that directs the signifying relations between life and matter. In Deely’s reinterpretation\, semiotic scaffolding can be understood as a structure that offers evolutionary directions to organisms and the relationships between them from an ecosystemic and material point of view. The scaffolding in an ecosystem can be interpreted as the planes in which organic and inorganic life meet and condition each other. \nFinally\, a reinterpretation of physiosemiosis from ecosemiotics will be proposed\, resemantising the notion of “Physis”\, in the Greek sense of the term\, i.e. nature in its whole. The semiotic scaffold can be a useful framework for making life and non-life dialogue through complicity and continuity\, showing the intricate semiotic network and its processes\, in a first and fundamental reality. Physiosemiotics\, from an ecosemiotic perspective\, can be seen as the structure of the semiotic scaffolding that makes ecosystemic organizations emerge.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/zengiaro/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T141500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T144500
DTSTAMP:20230801T041505Z
CREATED:20230624T090826Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T041505Z
UID:1464-1690985700-1690987500@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Massimo Cerizza
DESCRIPTION:In praise of Brainwaves as Tissue. A biosemiotic perspective\nUntil discovery of telescopes Saturn was thought\, by proto-scientists\, to be the last planet of our solar system. Equally nowadays\, in anatomic perspective\, the skin is considered histologically the furthest tissue that divides us from \, and is in contact with the external environment. But exactly as the upgrade of lens technology made observable otherwise invisible objects in the skies\, the upgrade in physics of electromagnetic waves by Maxwell led to the discovery of brain electromagnetic waves made observable by electroencephalography 100 years ago. \nAll around the head exists an appreciable amount of electromagnetic energy  brain related. It reaches the skin through bones and goes further. It can be measured as waves with their amplitude and frequency. \nAfter 100 years of study and research\, forty of which even I\, myself\, have worked\, I have felt the urge to expose a biosemiotic analysis about the ontological and classificatory status of brain waves in the context of anatomy and histology. Otherwise maybe for next 100 years\, brain waves will still be considered devoid of an autonomous status as tissue\, differently from blood or connective tissue or nervous tissue. But the urges of times on the technological side find the biosemiotic community structure\, both theoretically and personally on the rise. \nA serious theoretical community implant that states that life is based on sign action\, not just molecular interaction. I hope all the main schools of biosemiotics will best appreciate the nature of a tissue where molecules are zero\, made of waves that are mere energy\, no mass (or a vanishingly small mass). In that “tissue” persists the pure sign action devoid of the molecular interaction but that is also firmly grounded on solid empirical observables of neurophysiology and molecules. \nAs the astronomical community discovered Uranus and its meaning beyond Saturn\, so nowadays the biosemiotic community has the opportunity to discover a tissue beyond skin. A tissue made of signs\, because it has no molecules. A tissue where the basic unit of life is nearly 100% pure biosemiosis deserves a proper ontological status able to be included in an extended view of anatomy\, and not only of physiology. Anatomy of waves of course\, but not less physical than bones. Tissue of bones gives time to be seen even with no skill. Other tissues need to be fixed and processed to be conserved and studied\, otherwise they decay. \nThis tissue “Brainwaves” has the shortest time possible to be seen because electromagnetic waves are light. One hundred millisecond for waves\, 100 years for bones. (Yes you have to be on the ball to catch it on the neurophysiological practice). \nSurely far faster in its cycle than DNA expression or protein building\, this extreme difference on both planes\, of speed and of immateriality do create some difficulties in cognitive acceptance of such a mechanism that extends the depth of semiotic freedom. \nNot to be scared by those differences\, but we are committed to searching for similarities\, a useful ethical choice in “making-meaning” of “Brain Waves As a Tissue” because it’s even ours. \n  \nReferences \nHoffmeyer\, Jesper (2008). Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life of Signs. University of Scranton Press. \nda Silva\, F Lopes (1991). Neural mechanisms underlying brain waves: from neural membranes to networks. Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol. 1991 Aug; 79(2):81-93.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/cerizza/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T131500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T141500
DTSTAMP:20230801T041942Z
CREATED:20230624T090854Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T041942Z
UID:1472-1690982100-1690985700@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Lunch
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/lunch-3/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T131500
DTSTAMP:20231029T090611Z
CREATED:20230624T090910Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231029T090611Z
UID:1475-1690980300-1690982100@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:John Pickering
DESCRIPTION:Extending Biosemiotics\nThe Extended Evolutionary Synthesis also extends the role of biosemiotics. This paper will seek to extend it further\, both to the metaphysics of C. S. Peirce and A. N Whitehead and to Ingold’s treatment of inheritance (Ingold\, 2022). \nFirstness\, experience without reaction\, is fundamental to Peirce’s metaphysics\, giving qualia an ontological status equivalent to matter.  Thus his broader concepts\, such as tychism and synechism\, are actually aspects of panpsychism. By bringing Peirce and von Uexküll together\, biosemiotics restores meaning\, and hence subjectivity\, to biology. This paper will propose to move beyond biology to a more universal view of subjectivity. \nAt first sight it might appear that Hoffmeyer agrees\, since he notes “This world is full of subjects and something must have created them.” (Hoffmeyer\, 1996\, page 57). However\, he stops short of panpsychism and takes subjectivity to be something that emerges with an evolutionary increase in semiotic freedom. \nBut to say that evolution proceeds without subjectivity and then at some point it just emerges is hardly an explanation. If evolution is accompanied by an increase in subjectivity\, there must have been some there to start with. It is more parsimonious to claim that subjectivity occurs universally to a greater or lesser extent. \nThis paper will suggest that taking this view offers an opportunity to extend biosemiotics\, not only towards metaphysics but also towards Ingold’s radical view of evolution itself\, in which ecology is central. Further\, it will propose that this will make biosemiotics more relevant to the ecological crisis facing us all (Pickering\, 2023). \n  \nReferences \nHoffmeyer\, J. (1996) Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. \nPickering\, J. (2023) Metaphysics Matters: Towards Semiotic Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies\, Vol. 30\, No. 1 -2\, 215-237. \nIngold\, T. (2022) Evolution without Inheritance: Steps to an Ecology of Learning. Current Anthropology\, Vol. 63\, supplement 25\, 32-54. \nPresentation handout text (PDF download) \nSlides from the presentation
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/pickering/
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UID:1471-1690978500-1690980300@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Julian Zubek & Joanna Rączaszek-Leonardi
DESCRIPTION:A view on abstract concepts from an interaction-based perspective: An attempt at a semiotic analysis\nMost of the approaches to concepts\, both in cognitive science and in artificial intelligence\, are informed by information-processing views. Concepts are mapped to categories\, which despite their fuzzy boundaries\, graded structure and family resemblance (Rosch\, 1973)\, are still mostly characterized by objective features pertaining to the objects in those categories. This has not changed even in the newest deep learning models\, when those features are not translatable to straightforward descriptions but still objectively belong to the classified objects. \nYet in “action-first” or interactive modern paradigms\, such as ecological psychology and enactivism\, perception and action are inseparable\, and the world is perceived in terms of relational features\, affordances. This relational view puts center-stage the first-person experience\, including experience of one’s own movement and agency (Sheets-Johnston\, 2011)\, often in interaction with others\, which makes the theory of concepts deeply embodied\, situated\, naturally interactive and normative (Rączaszek-Leonardi & Zubek\, 2023). Such a view on concepts facilitates explaining their action and goal-relevance and their flexibility\, however begs the question about the processes of abstraction from the immediate contact with the world. \nIn our paper we will attempt to trace how the abstraction processes could look like\, and we envision them as particular historical and social paths of agents’ experience with the world. Following William James\, we will treat emergent knowledge structures as selection capabilities developed as skills in dealing with and making sense of the world. By attempting a semiotic analysis of this process\, we hope to shed light on a variety of possible trajectories of concepts acquisition. We will treat signs as constraints allowing selection between alternative concepts. As we will argue\, acquisition of a certain concept can be equated with the ability to interpret a sign leading to the selection of that concept. Apparently the same concept can be elicited by multiple signs\, possibly belonging to different classes (iconic\, indexical or symbolic). Congruently\, individual trajectories of acquiring a concept may vary and involve different semiotic processes. We will analyze the classic distinction between concrete and abstract concepts in the light of Peircean semiotic categories\, starting with firstness\, secondness and thirdness. The necessity of social interaction in establishing even the most concrete concepts using the most basic signs will be discussed. \nReferences \nRączaszek-Leonardi\, J.\, & Zubek\, J. (2023). Is love an abstract concept? A view of concepts from an interaction-based perspective. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B\, 378(1870)\, 20210356. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0356 \nRosch\, E. H. (1973). Natural categories. Cognitive Psychology\, 4(3)\, 328–350. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(73)90017-0 \nSheets-Johnstone\, M. (2011). The primacy of movement (expanded 2nd edn). Amsterdam\, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/zubek/
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T114500
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UID:1470-1690976700-1690978500@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Frederik Stjernfelt
DESCRIPTION:Peirce’s ideas of the man-animal distinction\nPeirce was an evolutionist and one of the first to generalize the concept of evolution from biology to physics and sociology alike. He also took some interest in locating what it is that separates the human animal from other higher animals. As to biological instinct\, it was the human urge to externalize signs in art\, technology and science and other products of the extended mind; semiotically\, it was the ability to make hypostatic abstractions; psychologically\, it was the notion of extended self-control. This paper revisits Peirce’s conceptions of the human condition. Peirce ascribed humanity great tasks in the evolution of the planet as of the universe; yet\, his evaluation of the individual human animal was very low\, as to autonomy\, courage\, moral\, as well as intelligence. By which means did he think this chasm between the individual human animal and the grand aims of humanity could be bridged?
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/stjernfelt/
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T113000
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CREATED:20230624T090854Z
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UID:1469-1690975800-1691019900@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Coffee break
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/coffee-break-5/
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T110000
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DTSTAMP:20230801T042133Z
CREATED:20230624T090910Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042133Z
UID:1474-1690974000-1690975800@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Tommi Vehkavaara
DESCRIPTION:Meaningfulness and applicability of semiotic concepts in biosemiotics\nThe 1st Gatherings in biosemiotics was held 22 years ago in Copenhagen and the first sentence of its CFP proclaimed the intention “to establish a regular framework for discussions of biosemiotics in the context of biology”. I must have been taken that seriously\, because without being biologist at all\, my talk was titled “How and why to naturalize semiotic concepts for biosemiotics?”\, i.e. how semiotic concepts of human\, mental\, logical\, and linguistic sciences might be applicable in the natural science of biology (Vehkavaara 2002). Eight years later\, the sixth of the so-called Saka-theses (Kull et al. 2009) proclaimed “(b)iosemiotics does not take for granted the wide variety of concepts of the sign\, sign action\, and so on […] but undogmatically sees these as a resource for the construction of an up-to-date\, refined\, and better-grounded […] version of a general semiotics” (p. 170). The question is the same as my talk in 1st Gatherings. One of the many difficulties in this is the integration of conceptual and empirical studies. Often in empirical studies\, the phenomena are dealt with standard biological manners\, and the semiotic concepts either play a rather thin and decorative role\, or are referred only in some vague intuitive senses. Theoretical studies\, in turn\, easily stuck into debates between competing abstract definitions without criteria specific enough to control their applicability. Some of the theoreticians start from a kind of foundational and universalistic semiotic metaphysics or transcendental philosophy (seemingly e.g. Søren Brier\, John Deely\, Kalevi Kull\, and Thure von Uexküll) that is supposed to replace more standard non-semiotic naturalism. Others take the opposite strategy and start from standard physical theory but aim to end up showing how semiotic concepts emerge or become possible as the complexity of physico-chemical systems increases (e.g. Deacon 2013\, Short 2007\, Bickhard 1998\, and to some extent Hoffmeyer 1993). This last strategy may nevertheless be too consuming for more concrete studies\, and therefore perhaps some antifoundationalist and pluralist naturalism would be more preferable. In these biosemiotic approaches\, it would be accurate to consider on which grounds and how the theoretical starting points are chosen? \nIn empirical studies\, the choice appears often as rather random\, but it is implicitly present even in the naturalistic strategy of Deacon and others\, because some preliminary idea about signhood or meaningfulness is after all required. Be the starting points some already developed semiotic conceptions or merely intuitive ideas\, we should pay attention to the semiotic phenomena that we use as exemplary prototypes for the used or constructed concepts of sign\, meaning\, etc. Of the already established semiotic theories and conceptions applied in biosemiotic studies\, several motivating problems and starting point intuitions can be listed: (1) subjectively meaningful perception (e.g. Uexküll\, Husserl\, and Sonesson)\, (2) socially shared mental ideas (e.g. Saussure and structuralists\, Lotman\, and later Wittgenstein)\, (3) representational cognition of rational inquiry (Peirce and Dewey)\, (4) mechanical action or correspondence (e.g. Barbieri’s cry “meaning is a molecule!”\, protosign of Sharov 2015\, and possibly Morris’ behaviorism)\, (5) intentional or teleological action (e.g. Alexander 2013\, constructive representation of Vehkavaara 2003\, and minimal ontological representation of Bickhard 1998). These differing starting points produce the differently structured and functioning concepts of sign or meaning. I would take it unlikely that any single concept of sign or semiosis could be sufficient to describe all biosemiotic processes and be somehow self-evidently universally applicable. It is also possible that in many cases more than one differently structured signs functions together. \n  \n  \nReferences \nKull\, K. et al. (2009). Theses on Biosemiotics: Prolegomena to a Theoretical Biology. Biological Theory 4(2)\, 167–173. \nStjernfelt\, F. (2022). Sheets\, Diagrams\, and Realism in Peirce. de Gruyter GmbH. Berlin/Boston.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/vehkavaara/
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230802T103000
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CREATED:20230624T090953Z
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UID:1479-1690972200-1690974000@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Sigmund Ongstad
DESCRIPTION:Structures of Animal Utterances Seen as Aesthetics – and as Communication. Semiotic perspectives on functions of so-called animal beauty\n  \nDue to a dramatic increase of research in ethology and zoo-communication over the last decades biosemiotics has now access to an extensive amount of empirical studies of how and why animals structure their utterances. Research on this key communicational element may focus on its physicality (as science) and/or a particular structure’s quality (as aesthetics). For zoo-communicational research on utterances both are necessary. Some of these empirical studies contain detailed and rich information which should enable meta-studies of formed structures of animal utterances. \nOne such study is Prum (2017) suggesting that birds’ plumage should\, in line with Darwin’s mostly rejected view\, be seen as a result of an evolutionary battle between displaying\, functioning as addressive temptation and as evaluative spectating of the display. He claims that a race between performing and judging has\, over time\, changed the game from “the survival of the fittest” to “the survival of the prettiest”. \nPrum’s research is preferred as empirical (meta-)data for my study\, not because of his “Darwinian” claim that beauty drives evolution\, but for his meticulous diachronic study of feathers and plumage and for his principle discussion of the possible functions of structured form of animal utterances. Epistemologically\, especially two relevant perspectives intersects in his work\, an aesthetical\, focusing the function of form as “beauty” and a more holistic one\, where form is seen as part of (semiotic) communication in a wider sense. \nI am not alone paying interest in this issue. Kull (2022) aims to make sense of animal aesthetics by an adjusted Peircean semiotics\, specifically through his coined notion “perfect semiotic fitting”. That beauty drives evolution Kull basically consider as false. He turns his attention to the sign-level in order to problematise the notion of beauty in nature (and culture) and suggests that semiotics is a relevant tool for problematising even animal aesthetics. \nOngstad (2019) presents a socio-semiotic framework for studies of animal utterances and life-genres (‘habits’). It stresses meso-level concepts such as utterance and life-genre to enable a bridging between micro (the sign) and macro (the Umwelt). Further\, it combines four semiotic levels sign\, utterance\, life-genre\, and life-world\, and further five intertwined communicational aspects\, form\, content\, act\, time\, and space as well as a set of processes\, such as semiosis and positioning. Such a framework should enable a discussion of the role of structured form as part of a taxon’s communicational system. \nI will first discuss claimed roles and functions of formed structures of birds’ utterances in Prum (2017) based on the framework by contrasting an aesthetic and a communicational perspective and further search\, comparatively\, for compatibilities between the semiotic perspectives of Kull (2022) and of Ongstad (2019). \n  \nReferences  \nKull\, K. (2022). The biosemiotic fundamentals of aesthetics: beauty is the perfect semiotic fitting. Biosemiotics\, 15(1)\, 1-22. \nOngstad\, S. (2019). A conceptual framework for studying evolutionary origins of life-genres. Biosemiotics\, 12(2)\, 245-266. \nPrum\, R. O. (2018). The evolution of beauty: How Darwin’s forgotten theory of mate choice shapes the animal world-and us. Anchor.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/ongstad/
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