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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230731T000000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230804T235959
DTSTAMP:20230727T183952Z
CREATED:20230624T085708Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230727T183952Z
UID:1423-1690761600-1691193599@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Gatherings in Biosemiotics 2023
DESCRIPTION:Program information for the Gatherings in Biosemiotics 2023.\nYou can review the presentation schedule for this year’s Gatherings starting from here.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/gatherings-in-biosemiotics-2023/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T100000
DTSTAMP:20230809T212931Z
CREATED:20230624T090954Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212931Z
UID:1481-1691055000-1691056800@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Alexei Sharov
DESCRIPTION:Semiotics of potential meanings\n[Slides from the presentation] \nBecause semiosis is coextensive with living and life-dependent semiotic agents\, meanings (relations of entities to something else that is significant for agents) exist only on condition that semiotic agency exists capable of using/interpreting them. However\, meanings can be actual or potential\, depending on whether they are interpreted by semiotic agents at the given time\, or not interpreted\, respectively. An example of potential meaning is a natural resource (or its feature) that initially has not been utilized by organisms because of the lack of either sense organs or ‘knowledge’ of how to do it. Later\, when agents gained access to this resource by adaptive evolution and/or by learning\, potential meaning turns into actual meaning. \nBecause intrinsic properties of resources remain the same before and after actualization\, it makes sense to consider such potential meanings existing even before they become actual\, but retrospectively. Physics describes potentiality as a field that can be measured at any point in space by an appropriate device. Thus\, I suggest treating potential meaning as a semiotic field that can be measured by some competent semiotic agent if it is placed near the meaning carrier (which is a potential sign). By observing the activity of the agent (e.g.\, living cell) we can simultaneously detect the existence of meaning that was in a potential state before the experiment\, and the capacity of the agent to respond. Thus\, the ontology of meanings is agency-dependent and knowledge-dependent. Meaning is subjective when initially discovered\, but it can spread via communication and become objective within the community of agents. The collective knowledge is updated with the emergence of each new kind of agency: first\, actual meanings are updated in space-and-time proximity of these new agents\, and second\, potential meanings are updated in the whole universe\, as well as in the reconstructed past\, and in the projected future. \nRetrospectively\, the origin of life can be explained as a transition of some pre-existing potential meanings (e.g.\, resources and catalysts) into actual meanings that acquire goal-directedness via collective mutual support and propagation. Thus\, life most likely emerged in complex micro-environments enriched in non-redundant potential meanings. Following Deely\, I assume that such complex environments can ignite the origin of life or provide resources for already existing life. Evolution of living organisms continued actualization of some already existing potential meanings\, and these actualized natural meanings together with new artificial meanings became encoded in hereditary signs and memory for the purpose of reusing them when necessary within the lifespan and beyond (in the progeny). Memory in organisms is a repository of potential meanings (i.e.\, passive memory units that can be activated to communicate their meaning) that enables organisms to adapt on demand by activating interpretation of these potential meanings.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/sharov/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T103000
DTSTAMP:20230809T212835Z
CREATED:20230624T090954Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212835Z
UID:1482-1691056800-1691058600@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Michael Yudanin
DESCRIPTION:Discursivity and semiotic complexity as driving the shape of animal choice and human freedom\n[Slides from the presentation] \nBiosemiotics\, it seems\, holds the key not only to understanding life but also to one of the more intractable issues that has been bewildering philosophy for a long while – the question of freedom. If we are to try and reconcile the possibility of free choice with biological facts\, we ought to explain how biochemically constructed beings\, subject to biological and thus ultimately physical causality\, can be capable of choosing between alternatives\, not randomly but deliberately\, as random choice can hardly qualify as meaningful control of an organism over itself. Moreover\, we will have to explain it while taking into consideration both the diversity of life on Earth and its evolutionary development. I will argue that Hoffmeyer\, when he attached the name of semiotic freedom to the semiotic complexity that reflects “the depth of meaning communicated or interpreted by living systems\,” is hinting at an important dependency: the degree of freedom is determined by the organism’s capacity to communicate and interpret more complex indicators (Hoffmeyer\, 2010). In the conception of freedom I will be advocating\, the capacity for choice is potentially present in all life and is realized when an organism becomes capable of both acting in the world and representing alternatives to its own consciousness\, or achieving a certain level of Hoffmeyer’s semiotic complexity. The scope of freedom here is determined by the organism’s Umwelt. Yet\, when discursive meta-cognition appears\, the Umwelt becomes vastly more dynamic\, subject more to the limits imposed by the human organism’s own intent rather than merely to the boundaries defined by physiology. This is no simple supervenience: the choices we make consciously alter the boundaries of our semiosphere\, as do the choices others make. This changes the semiotic dynamics of freedom and makes it a very interesting research subject with implications that go beyond individual and all the way to educational and other policies\, as I will try to suggest. \n  \nReferences \nHoffmeyer\, J. (2010). God and the World of Signs: Semiotics and the Emergence of Life. Zygon\, 45(2)\, 367-390.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/yunadin/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T103000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T110000
DTSTAMP:20230809T212739Z
CREATED:20230624T090954Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212739Z
UID:1483-1691058600-1691060400@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Hongbing Yu
DESCRIPTION:Danger Modeling: Meaning-generation in Three Dimensions\n[Slides from the presentation] \nIn the struggle for existence\, any known species of organisms must avert danger to ensure survival. To do that\, they need to identify—or model—it in ways that are specific to their species and actualized in concrete situations. This is an act of generating meaning that falls perfectly within the purview of biosemiotics. The present chapter uses human danger modeling as a case in point to discuss meaning-generation in the biosemiotic context. The rationale is a three-fold one. Firstly\, the study of danger\, understood in the aspect of meaning-generation\, makes an example of semiotic analysis\, because warning signs are among the most primordial and relevant vehicles for meaning. Secondly\, the Sebeokian concept of modeling serves as a useful tool to tackle this problem. The reason is that the concept underscores semiotic agency and promises to be a highly integrative framework for studying meaning-generation. Thirdly\, humans have evolved into such complex superorganisms that we not only live by existential modeling and semiotic modeling at same time but also deeply entangled in our own semiotic webs while probing into and creating possibilities of new meanings. This threefold rationale underlines the need for a comprehensive approach that considers meaning-generation as actualized in different dimensions. This chapter identifies three such dimensions\, namely\, the representational\, interpretational\, and existential dimension. These three dimensions form a system that corresponds roughly to the Peircean triad of semiosis.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/yu/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T113000
DTSTAMP:20230809T212628Z
CREATED:20230624T091008Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212628Z
UID:1485-1691060400-1691062200@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Liqian Zhou & Qiufen Sun
DESCRIPTION:More constraints\, more freedom: Revisiting semiotic scaffolding\, semiotic freedom\, and semiotic emergence\n[Slides from the presentation] \nTechnically\, constraint is defined as the reduction of degree of freedom. However\, novelties emerge in dynamic systems with constraints. Constraints make once almost impossible states become possible. That is\, constraint may raise the probability of the actual realization of possible states once being only possible but having rare chance to actually realize. When a dynamic system stabilizes to a state with certain constraints\, it provides a scaffolding for new possibilities at higher level. Therefore\, Emergence of novelties at a higher level is possible. We may say\, more constraints create more freedom. \nThis way of understanding dynamic emergence may also help us further understand Jesper Hoffmeyer’s seminal works on semiotic scaffolding\, semiotic freedom\, and semiotic emergence. Semiotic scaffolding makes semiotic freedom of living systems possible. As Hoffmeyer (2015) argues\, \n  \n“Yet\, this particular strategy potentially ignites a self-perpetuating evolutionary dynamics\, since each step taken by a species along this route potentially opens new agendas for further change: the more capable some species are of anticipating and interpreting complex and fast changing situations or events\, the more will evolution favor the development in other species of a well-adjusted set of semiotic tools.” \n  \nIn the presentation\, I will take Terrence Deacon‘s work on the origin of life and therefore of semiosis as an example to show how semiotic scaffolding and semiotic emergence can be understood in terms of the dialectics of constraint and freedom. This understanding indicates that semiotics emergence is a dynamic emergence which is a kind of weak emergence rather than strong ones. It also brings new insight to reconsider the epistemic cut. \n  \nReferences  \nBruni\, L. E. (2008). Semiotic freedom: Emergence and teleology in biological and cognitive Interfaces. The American Journal of Semiotics\, 24(1/3)\, 57-73. \nDeacon\, T. (2021). How molecules become signs. Biosemiotics\, 14\, 537-559. \nHoffmeyer\, J. (2007). Semiotic scaffolding of living systems. In Babieri\, M. (ed). Introduction to Biosemiotics: The New Biological Synthesis. Dordrecht: Springer\, 149-166. \n  \n 
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/zhou-sun/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T113000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T114500
DTSTAMP:20230801T042452Z
CREATED:20230624T091008Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042452Z
UID:1484-1691062200-1691063100@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Coffee break
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/coffee-break-7/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T114500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T121500
DTSTAMP:20230801T042709Z
CREATED:20230624T091009Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042709Z
UID:1488-1691063100-1691064900@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:John Schumann
DESCRIPTION:Symbolic Concepts and Physicality\n  \nIn this paper\, I will address four aspects of physicality as they relate to symbolic concepts: science and symbolic concepts\, entropy\, self-organization\, and biological energy. \nI have suggested that certain concepts do not have exclusively physical referents. They refer to concepts that lack mass\, energy\, and observability\, but nevertheless\, they maintain one characteristic of physicality (ie\, causal effects). Such symbolic concepts include democracy\, agency\, law\, defense\, absurdity\, consciousness\, happiness\, rigidity\, truth\, grounding\, reference\, science\, meaning\, hate\, physicality\, mental concepts\, mind\, information. \nSCIENCE AND SYMBOLIC CONCEPTS. It is interesting to note that in much of scientific discourse\, the concept “abstract” is entirely acceptable\, but the concept “nonphysical” is taboo. But often the very definitions of “abstract” indicate that such concepts lack physicality (eg\, “Abstract thinking is the ability to understand concepts that are real\, such as freedom or vulnerability\, but are not directly tied to concrete physical objects and experiences” (Joy\, R.\, 2019). Could it be the case that\, within the context of a scientific endeavor\, there is a tendency to assume that the concepts reference physical entities? In other words\, do we assume that if we are doing science\, we are examining the physical world? Have we implicitly modeled the world such that we expect all concepts to refer to material entities? \nENTROPY. Entropy is generally seen as a tendency for dissipation\, decrease/loss of energy through work. Symbolic concepts might be seen as entropic phenomena (lexical/conceptual entropy) from several perspectives. Symbolic concepts get their meaning from other words with related meanings and are therefore difficult to define. They have multiple meanings and therefore their referents can be difficult to predict and thus interpret. As a result\, they produce uncertainty. Their meanings can change over time\, and they may be difficult if not impossible to translate into another language. Average entropy measures average information\, and thus it is a measurement of uncertainty (Solms\, 2021\, p.157). As applied to the physicality issue addressed here\, we might argue that the more definitions and synonyms that a particular concept carries\, the greater the entropy\, the uncertainty\, and the predictability of the meaning of a concept in a particular context. \nSELF ORGANIZATION. Could symbolic concepts be\, in some way\, self-organizing phenomena? Could the fact that they lack mass\, energy\, observability make them essentially open to several meanings by having iconic features that allow them to be considered similar or identical to other concepts. Their quasi-physicality makes them abstract and therefore\, to a significant extent\, liberates them from the strictly physical world. \nBIOLOGICAL ENERGY. In a discussion of the biological phenomenon of arousal\, Pfaff (2005) says “satisfying the need for an ‘energy source’ for behavior\, arousal explains the initiation and persistence of motivated behavior in a wide variety of species… a concept like arousal is necessary to explain the initiation\, strength\, and persistence of behavioral responses.” \n  \nReferences \nJoy\, R. (2019) Abstract thinking. (p.1-2)\, HealthLine. \nPfaff\, D. (2005)\, Brain Arousal and Information Theory. Cambridge\, MA\, Harvard University Press\, cited in Solms\, M. (2021)\, The Hidden Spring: A Journey to the Source of Consciousness (p. 306).)
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/schumann/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T124500
DTSTAMP:20230809T212512Z
CREATED:20230624T091025Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212512Z
UID:1490-1691064900-1691066700@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Mario Giampetro
DESCRIPTION:The biosemiotic process: How to reproduce and adapt the identity of social systems by combining emotions and language\n[Slides from the presentation] \n  \nBiosemiotics concerns the process of learning of complex adaptive systems that operate across multiple scales and levels of organization. This comprises the formation of informed autocatalytic processes (functional cycles) that can express an adaptable identity by establishing an impredicative entailment between the (tangible) biophysical expression of a complex metabolic pattern and a (notional) “expected state”. Reproducing and adapting this identity requires effective communication within semiotic controls. By iterating the making of models of themselves (on the notional side) and the instantiation of these models (on the tangible side) these systems manage to preserve the meaning of tangible information carriers used in this communication. In this way\, the identity of the biosemiotic process remains the same (at the level of the whole) even when the various elements – the types in the models (on the notional side) and the instances in the metabolic networks (on the tangible side) – change in time. Thus\, the biosemiotic process makes copies of itself through time\, but these copies neither refer to specific instances of structural elements nor to the representations of the types recorded on the notional side; they refer to holons instead. \nI postulate that the differences between the semiotic processes in ecological and human systems are related to the use of a language in the human system that permits a reflexive definition of identity. Humans must define their own group identity (to be preserved) using themselves as an external referent. To do so\, they create an exosomatic mind—i.e.\, a collective UMWELT and awareness tailored to the chosen group identity—that is described and operationalized by using a language. This represents a major complication in their biosemiotic process (i.e.\, the mind versus body bifurcation). Luhmann suggests that the formation and evolution of human society is determined by an iteration between: (i) communications (in the notional part—REPRESENTATION) carried out by the collective MIND that stores\, reproduces and updates the existing knowledge claims\, anticipatory models\, institutional organization\, rules and norms; and (ii) interactions (in the tangible part—ACTION)\, needed to check the viability of the metabolic pattern associated with the reproduction and operation of its structural and functional components (humans and technological devices). The resonance between communication and interaction relies on the same strategy as adopted by ecological systems (the adaptive cycle): human societies send messages to themselves across hierarchical levels to achieve TRANSDUCTION. In ecological systems transduction is carried out by biophysical processes regulated by codes – using either types to make instances (downward causation) or instances to define types (upward causation). In human society\, on the other hand\, this commuting across the epistemic cut (notional/tangible) takes place across two external contexts: (i) the psychic structure—”the body” of the society (the endosomatic experience of feelings of individuals). Here emotions\, fears\, aspirations\, and dreams affect the definition of the group identity (final causes) and therefore ultimately affect the “rational decisions” of the mind; and (ii) the biophysical context of the metabolic network that determines the feasibility and viability of interactions. The communications that a society transmits to itself are sent and received by many different purpose-driven agents operating within different UMWELTs. The meaning of this heterogeneous flow of communications (based on non-equivalent external referents and non-reducible types of awareness) cannot be preserved by using a formal language\, but only by shared feelings associated with affective interactions in the psychic structure.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/giampetro/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T131500
DTSTAMP:20230809T212420Z
CREATED:20230624T091025Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212420Z
UID:1492-1691066700-1691068500@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Alin Olteanu
DESCRIPTION:A Biosemiotic Approach to Gender: Avoiding Morphological Freedom\n[Slides from the lecture] \nThis paper proposes a biosemiotic approach to gender. I argue that\, in order for biosemiotic theory to be properly relevant for the humanities and social sciences in general\, a biosemiotic discourse on gender and sexuality is needed. Also\, I explain that a biosemiotic approach to gender is particularly insightful for current debates in cultural studies. \nWhile biosemiotics studies meaning as embodied and environmental and has been recently employed in cultural criticism (Cobley 2016)\, it did not address gender\, so far. Both gender studies and feminism have been founded and dominated by a (post)structuralist array of semiotic theories\, which tend to compete with theories that take Peirce’s pragmatism as foundational\, such as\, par excellence\, biosemiotics. Also\, the popular construal of gender as performed culturally and through behavior (Butler 1993) rests on analytical philosophy of language\, which is at odds with the biosemiotic perspective (Cobley 2016). \nWithout overlooking the merits of established approaches in gender studies\, I unfurl what a biosemiotic view entails for gender and explain the main differences between these two perspectives. To begin with\, a biosemiotic approach construes gender according to how gender is involved in the construction of environments (Umwelten)\, understood as the subjective phenomenal worlds of organisms. As such\, gender appears as a continuously evolving dimension of a semiotic agent. More than fluid\, gender is never fixed. As from a Peircean perspective knowing subjects are never ‘complete’ selves\, neither do they ever arrive at ‘complete’ versions of our gender and sexuality. Further\, gender is understood to both depend on and reconfigure the affordances and semiotic competences that an organism has as its disposal in an environment. Hence\, gender is conceived not only as limited by the past (natural evolution\, cultural constraints) and performed in the present but also in a future-oriented interrogation of what the self may become. \nI argue that a biosemiotics interrogation of gender can tackle the currently salient\, difficult and controversial notion of morphological freedom\, particularly characteristic for transhumanism (Sandberg 2013). This notion holds that\, by expanding the mind through science and technology\, the morphology of bodies can be rendered obsolete in regard to consciousness and the constitution of agency. While it contradicts decades of philosophy of embodiment\, the notion is very difficult to attack without making controversial implications. I explain that a biosemiotic view posits that (material) forms of bodies and in environments (landscapes) play a role in the construction of gender but while still allowing for a transhuman construal of selves as becoming. From this perspective\, gender is a present and open becoming towards a variety of possible futures. As such\, biosemiotics can make an important step in the direction of Butler’s (1993) proposal to dissolve the dichotomy of culture and materiality through the notion of queerness. \n  \nReferences \nButler\, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of “sex”. Routledge. \nCobley\, P. (2016). Cultural implications of biosemiotics. Springer. \nSandberg\, A. (2013). Morphological freedom – why we not just want it\, but need it. In: Max More\, Natasha Vita-More. Eds. The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science\, Technology\, and Philosophy of the Human Future\, 56-64. John Wiley & Sons.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/olteanu/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T131500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T141500
DTSTAMP:20230801T042640Z
CREATED:20230624T091008Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042640Z
UID:1487-1691068500-1691072100@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Lunch
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/lunch-4/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T141500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T144500
DTSTAMP:20230809T212311Z
CREATED:20230624T091026Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212311Z
UID:1493-1691072100-1691073900@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Tim Ireland
DESCRIPTION:The Cognitive Spiral: Semiotic Freedom & Space\n[Slides from the presentation] \nSpace has history and has taken different forms in different societies and at different times depending on the experiences accounted for and the available means to externalise and represent these (Jammer 2013). The representation is conditional on the technique used\, delineating a cognitive loop between representation and comprehension that narrows the conception of space to a direct reference to that which is perceived. In other words\, the method of representation determines the perception of that represented\, and vice versa. A self-reinforcing cycle between inner “mental” space and outer world\, whereby cognition is a form of niche by which we adapt to and mould the world according to our purposes and desires. \nGeometry is one way experience is replicated and through which problems are solved. ”[A] certain schematization of experience\, which we may call space […] in the sense that it is formed from experience by the application of some principle (Wiener and Masani 1976:99). Peirce does not say much about space but what he does say correlates with Uexküll presentation of space because their thinking is based in sign-action. In The Order of Nature Peirce emphasises there are “general truths” that are so extraordinary that “even if we are to suppose that they are not strictly universal truths\, we cannot possibly think that they have been reached by pure accident.” And that the “most remarkable laws of this kind are those of time and space” (EP1:180). He implies space is not just an idea\, but a fundamental feature of life\, tied to causal relations between things and their effect in the process of perception-action. Peirce presents\, albeit in nascent form\, space to be a product of excitation produced through sign-relations\, which correlates with Uexküll’s definition. For\, like the idea of ‘force’\, “in its rudiments\, is another conception so early arrived at\, and found in animals so low in the scale of intelligence\, that it must be supposed innate” (EP1:180-181). A scaffold\, or natural law which is an essential component of living things. From the simplest to the most intricate. “The great utility and indispensableness of the conceptions of time\, space\, and force\, even to the lowest intelligence\, are such to suggest that they are the results of natural selection. Without something like geometrical\, kinetical and mechanical conceptions\, no animal could seize his food or do anything which might be necessary” (EP1:181). We might infer from this (on the premise that an organism’s world is constituted of a plethora of signs available to it) the first principle of Umwelt theory; that the synthesis between an organism’s and its environment expands relative to the complexity of the organism. Hence space is defined by an organism’s semiotic freedom. In Uexküll we find the biological roots of space\, and in Peirce we find the semiotic supposition for the forming of space (understood to be a network of relations)\, to be a process of sign-action. \nI aim to illustrate how the above Peircean-Uexkullian notion of space infers a cognitive spiral whereby space (or a cell-centric model of) extends from a fundamental model (i.e.\, that of a cell) to more developed\, nuanced and complex forms of space (such as our own); and that this corresponds to the idea of a developmental process\, or stages\, of spatial intelligence\, which transfers through human cultural representation and the built environment. \n  \nReferences \nHouser\, N.\, & Kloesel\, C. J. (1992). The Essential Peirce\, Volume 1: Selected Philosophical Writings (1867–1893). Indiana University Press. \nJammer\, Max (2013). Concepts of space: the history of theories of space in physics: third. Courier Corporation. \nWiener\, Norbert and Pesi Rustom Masani (1976). Norbert Wiener Collected Works with Commentaries. MIT Press.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/ireland/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T144500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T151500
DTSTAMP:20230809T212159Z
CREATED:20230624T091128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T212159Z
UID:1494-1691073900-1691075700@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Pauline Delahaye
DESCRIPTION:Diagnosing\, Modelling and Solving Interspecies Cohabitation Issues: Anatomy of the Shared Semiosphere\n[Slides from the presentation] \nIn this communication\, I will present different steps of diagnosing and modelling a shared urban semiosphere in order to solve interspecies cohabitation issues. Mainly\, this presentation will introduce key concepts needed for this work and methods used – what elements should be included in a basic corpus? In a more detailed one? What methodology should be preferred depending on the context and circumstances and what are its potential flaws? How to encourage a good and relevant interdisciplinary dialogue? All these questions will be addressed by presenting and comparing two projects in Paris (Delahaye\, 2021) and Tartu\, the last one being used as a case study. \nIn this presentation\, we will use the concept of semiosphere as defined by Hoffmeyer (1997) as “a sphere just like the atmosphere\, the hydrosphere and the biosphere”\, incorporating all kinds of “signs of life”. In this sense it could also be called in different ways like “semiotic ecosystem” or “ecosemiosphere” (Maran\, 2021)\, to use a specific term with a separate meaning. This question of terminology\, as well as others that could lead to confusion\, will be briefly discussed. \nAll the results and methodologies introduced in this communication are from a just-completed project in Tartu\, aiming to study relationships and interactions between humans and liminal species\, using the urban corvids as a case study – Corvus cornix\, Corvus frugilegus\, Coloeus monedula and\, to a lesser extent\, Corvus corone as comparative observations with the city of Paris. \nResults obtained will include elements of ethology or biology\, elements of anthropology and literary elements\, in order to present an exhaustive overview of this fundamentally interdisciplinary methodology. Methodological tools will be given in order to make these different and various components interact in an efficient way and to allow a potential investigator to interpret them in a relevant manner\, no matter their academic speciality or background. \n  \nReferences \nDelahaye\, P. (2021). Rats\, Mice and Humans. Linguistic Frontiers\, 4(1)\, 44‑52. https://doi.org/10.2478/lf-2021-0004 \nHoffmeyer\, J. (1997). Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Indiana University Press. \nMaran\, T. (2021). The Ecosemiosphere is a Grounded Semiosphere. A Lotmanian Conceptualization of Cultural-Ecological Systems. Biosemiotics\, 14(2)\, 519‑530. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-021-09428-w
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/delahaye/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T151500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T154500
DTSTAMP:20230809T211832Z
CREATED:20230624T091008Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230809T211832Z
UID:1486-1691075700-1691077500@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Constantijn-Alexander Kusters
DESCRIPTION:Time and Emergence: Towards a narrative inspired understanding of temporal semiosis\n[Slides from the presentation] \nWhat is the nature of time? Since the Einstein-Bergson debate this question has often been divided into two camps. One camp approaching space-time in a point-like manner in terms of mathematics and/or physics\, and a second camp favouring an anthropocentric phenomenological approach which understands this experienced temporality as irreducible to the ontological universality of Einstein’s space-time. In contrast\, this paper brings these two camps closer together by showing how temporality should be understood as an emergent phenomenon in the context of teleodynamic organization. This third approach leaves open a variety of roles time can play in different forms of dynamic organisation\, providing a more comprehensive understanding of its role in semiotic dynamics. Biosemiotically\, this also accounts for and affords time’s experience according to diverse Umwelten. \nTerrence Deacon’s model of autogenesis is shown to follow the same minimal logic of narrative exemplified by Claude Bremond’s structuralist writings on minimal narrative logic (Bremond 1980). By subsequently comparing Paul Ricœur’s narrative extension of hermeneutic temporality (Ricœur 2008) with how “inside and outside” are divided through individuating processes found in Deacon’s simplest model of teleodynamics\, the autogen model (Deacon 2013)\, is set out to understand temporality in this minimal form. Specifically\, Ricœur’s embracing of what he calls the aporetic nature of time is taken up\, which in part can be understood as the incommensurability of cosmic time (“universal” time i.e.\, the regular movement of celestial bodies) and phenomenological time (lived experience of time). By subsequently unstably “resolving” these two times in a continuous mimetic narrativization\, Ricœur’s narrative temporality reveals itself in congruence with the emergence of teleodynamics. We find similarly in teleodynamics that the difference between “inside and outside\,” while never “resolved\,” is mimetically mediated in (not) realizing the purpose expressed in the direction of teleodynamic organization. \nIt is then necessary to consider the threefold aspects of time in this context; (1) time “inside” which deals with change in terms of internal autocatalytic reactions necessary for autogenesis\, (2) time “outside” which is the change in context of the autogen’s environment\, and (3) in the process where “inside” and “outside” come together as mediated through attaining the purpose of its own self-replication. Neither (1)\, (2)\, or (3)\, can therefore be taken by themselves\, nor can they be reduced to a mere point in time as they all have a duration which influences the eventual success (or failure) of the self-replication. Insofar that more or less time is spent in relation to each could influences the outcome of self-replication\, a shift to a kind of temporal “thickness” is required capable of dealing with time in terms of meaning-making. This is “thickness” to the extent that it is the duration of time spent autocatalyzing (1)\, the duration of being in a contextually changing environment (2)\, and the duration of the process of self-replication (3) which influence the successfulness of attaining the continuation of this proto-evolutionary line. This extends work in biohermeneutics which till now had limited exposure to narrative temporality\, some exceptions being the work of Arran Gare and Anton Markoš. Introducing a narrative model of time to the emergence of semiotic dynamism capable of supporting meaningful time differentiation. \nReferences \nBremond\, C. (1980). The Logic of Narrative Possibilities. New Literary History\, 11(3)\, 387. \nDeacon\, T. W. (2013). Incomplete nature: how mind emerged from matter (1. paperback ed.). New York London: W.W. Norton. \nRicœur\, P. (2008). Time and narrative. Vol. 3. (K. McLaughlin\, Trans.) (Repr.\, Vol. 3). Chicago\, III.: Univ. of Chicago Press.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/klusters/
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T154500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T160000
DTSTAMP:20230801T042759Z
CREATED:20230624T091025Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042759Z
UID:1491-1691077500-1691078400@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Coffee break
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/coffee-break-8/
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T163000
DTSTAMP:20230801T042051Z
CREATED:20230624T090854Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T042051Z
UID:1473-1691078400-1691080200@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Brian Khumalo and Rick Stepp
DESCRIPTION:Refining how the term ‘Icon’ is conceived as a Step towards Nomothetic Descriptions of Behavioral-Ecological Events\nThe term icon is ubiquitous. For example\, in linguistics iconicity is conceived as the relationship between speech acts and meaning whereas in semiotics broadly\, iconicity is conceived as a grounded relationship between an icon and its referent. While these examples may be easier to reconcile than not\, fresh confusion has been introduced by Hoffman\, Manish\, and Chetan’s (2015) ‘Interface Theory of Perception’ (ITP) within perceptual science. The ITP also invokes icons as a foundational component. But are Hoffman and et al.’s ‘icons’ the same as semiotic ‘icons’? If not\, can these two definitions of ‘icon’ be reconciled? Taking their cue from von Uexküll\, the ITP posits that all biological organisms interact with the world via a species-specific user interface similar to a computer. The ITP builds on a theoretical assumption that perception did not evolve to represent reality as it is\, but rather to represent reality as it is useful to an organism thus maximizing fitness function. Consequently\, perceptual structures simplify reality to order and discriminate information and quell choice paralysis. Continuing with the computer analogy\, the ITP proposes that what organisms see as external objects are no different from computer icons. Icons in this way hide the complexity of a computer’s hardware and software and provide users units of interaction that are functional. Following Deely’s view that icons represent the first contact between sense perceptions and reality that generate initial qualitative experiences\, and Hoffmeyer’s description of iconic and indexical scaffolding\, we hope to show that the ITP icon and semiotic icon are one and the same. Providing some conceptual clarity for the term icon is important to minimize confusion amongst interested scholars. While potentially enriching\, a plurality of understanding can create challenges for interdisciplinary collaboration where the same analytical terms may be invoked with reference to a problem or event\, but understood differently by the parties involved. \n  \nReferences \nHoffmeyer\, J. (2015). Introduction: semiotic scaffolding. Biosemiotics\, 8(2)\, 153-158. \nHoffman\, D.D.\, Singh\, M. and Prakash\, C. (2015). The interface theory of perception. Psychonomic bulletin & review\, 22(6)\, pp.1480-1506. \nLockwood\, G. and Dingemanse\, M. (2015). Iconicity in the lab: A review of behavioral\, developmental\, and neuroimaging research into sound-symbolism. Frontiers in Psychology\, 6\, p.1246.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/khumalo-stepp/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20230803T170000
DTSTAMP:20230801T223444Z
CREATED:20230624T091129Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T223444Z
UID:1495-1691080200-1691082000@isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com
SUMMARY:Silver Rattasepp
DESCRIPTION:The Ontological Primacy of Umwelt\nIndividuation – the genesis of individual entities – is generally presumed to begin with the ontology of already constituted individuals. Thus claims Gilbert Simondon. Rather than describing the appearance of individual beings from something pre-individual\, the analysis of the appearance of concrete entities usually concerns itself with the appearance of composites\, in which ontological privilege is given to the already constituted individuals. Is this the case with Umwelt theory as well? A straightforward conception of umwelts would treat them as a composites of organism and environment\, and the emphasis is then on their mutual co-constitution through functional cycles. But does this not already assume the pre-constitution of both environments and organisms? If so\, another question could be asked: what is the origin and genesis of organisms and environments which are now\, as if after the fact\, to be indivisibly united once again by means of functional cycles? In an admittedly speculative vein\, and with the help of a certain resonance between the concepts of transaction\, individuation and schismogenesis\, the presentation attempts to propose that rather than organisms and environments\, it is the umwelt which is ontologically primary\, and that it is the internal division\, separation and individuation within umwelts which gives rise to the appearance of organisms together with their environments.
URL:https://isbsarchive.dreamhosters.com/gibs23pres/rattasepp/
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